



IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF MALAYSIA

(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

[CIVIL APPEAL NO : 02(f) - 50-05/2019(J)]

Between

**DUBON BERHAD
(IN LIQUIDATION)**

... APPELLANT

AND

WISMA COSWAY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION

... RESPONDENT

DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA

(BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN)

RAYUAN SIVIL NO. J - 02(A) - 768 - 04/2018

ANTARA

**WISMA COSWAY MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION**

... Perayu

DAN

**DUBON BERHAD
(Syarikat No: 046138-x)**

... Responden

[Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Johor Bahru

Penggulung Syarikat N o . 2 8 – 187 of 1999 (4)

Pasca Companies (Winding - Up) No . JA - 28PW-99- 11/2017]



Dalam perkara Seksyen 218 Akta
Syarikat, 1965

Dan

Dalam perkara Dubon Berhad
(terdahulu dikenali sebagai Dubon Sdn
Bhd)

Dan

Dalam perkara Seksyen 471 Akta
Syarikat, 2016

Dan

Dalam perkara Seksyen 226(3) Akta
Syarikat 1965

Antara

Golden Expension Sdn. Bhd
No.Syarikat: 270525 -H

... Pempetisyen

Dan

Dubon Berhad
(Syarikat Ni: 046138 -X)

... Responden

Wisma Cosway Management Corporation
(Strata Pendaftaran No: 1152)

... Pemohon

CORAM:

Azahar Mohamed, CJM

David Wong Dak Wah, CJSS

Rohana Yusuf, FCJ (as she then was)



Mohd. Zawawi Salleh, FCJ

Nallini Pathmana than, FCJ

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

[1] In the field of insolvency, the law on the rights of secured and unsecured creditors, as well as that relating to priorities and preference payments, is well settled in statute, and consequently by case-law, which provides both certainty and judicial precedent.

[2] This appeal was necessitated by reason of a failure to apply these well-settled principles. This judgment serves primarily to restate certain fundamental principles of law in this area.

[3] The sole leave question allowed by this Court on 9.5.2019, reads:

“Whether the right of a Joint Management Body or a Management Corporation to collect and receive payment from a proprietor under sections 33 and 77 of the Strata Management Act 2013 respectively, gives it a lawful preference as a secured creditor over the assets of a company in liquidation?”

(emphasis ours).

[4] In essence the question before us relates to whether **section 77 of the Strata Management Act 2013** (‘SMA’) has the effect of elevating the status of a debt incurred under it, to that of a secured or preferential debt within the insolvency regime, where the proprietor of the parcel concerned is in liquidation, or is bankrupt.

[5] In other words, do payments received or recovered by a Management Corporation (‘MC’) as a debt, from the proprietors of properties held under the **SMA** who are in liquidation or bankrupt, enjoy priority or preference over other creditors, equivalent to that accorded to secured creditors under

an insolvency regime.

[6] This question requires a consideration of **section 77 of the SMA**, and how its provisions are to be construed in light of the insolvency regime as statutorily governed **at the material time** by **section 292 of the Companies Act 1965 (now section 527 of the Companies Act 2016)** .

[7] **Section 77 of the Strata Management Act 2013** (‘SM A 2013’ or ‘the Act’) provides (in part) :

“Recovery of sum as a debt due to management corporation or subsidiary management corporation

*77. (1) The payment of any amount lawfully incurred by the management corporation or the subsidiary management corporation in the course of the exercise of any of its powers or functions or carrying out of its duties or obligations **shall by virtue of this section be guaranteed** by the proprietors for the time being constituting the management corporation or the subsidiary management corporation.*

(2)

(3)

(4)”

[Emphasis added]

[8] The principal argument in the Courts below was that the phrase *“shall by virtue of this section be guaranteed”* in **section 77(1) of the SM A 2013** supports the interpretation that the monies outstanding and due to the MC or the Joint Management Body (‘JMB’) constitutes a debt which is accorded priority such that it enjoys the status of a secured debt within the insolvency regime.

[9] We heard this appeal on 5 November 2019, unanimously allowed it, and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal. We answered the leave



question in the negative, meaning that **section 77 SMA does not** accord any form of priority or preference in relation to payments received by a MC from an insolvent parcel proprietor.

[10] This judgment states the reasons for our decision.

SALIENT BACKGROUND FACTS

[11] We adopt the summary of facts in both parties' submissions with modification. The Appellant, Dubon Berhad (in liquidation) ('the Company') is the **beneficial owner** of a lot known as Unit 22.05 ('the Unit') in Wisma Cosway. The Respondent, Wisma Cosway Management Corporation, is the management corporation of Wisma Cosway ('MC').

[12] The Company was wound up by an order of the Johor Bharu High Court dated 18.1.2000. As part of the process of realising the Company's assets, which included the Unit, the liquidators required the execution of the transfer of the Unit into the Company's name. This was necessary for the purposes of a sale of the subject property. (The liquidators were exercising their statutory duties to sell the property so as to bring in and pay off the debts of the Company in liquidation.)

[13] The request was made of one Stephens Properties Sdn Bhd ('**Stephens**'), which had developed Wisma Cosway. Stephens however refused to execute the transfer unless the Company first obtained a "clearance" letter from the MC in relation to an outstanding sum of RM 183,070.26 ('**Outstanding Sum**'). The Outstanding Sum comprised RM4,028.00 in "administrative and application fees" owed to Stephens ('**Stephens' Sum**') and RM179,042.26 payable as outgoings and service charges in respect of Unit 20.25 owed to the MC ('**MC's Sum**').

[14] The Company through its liquidator denied the claim. It took the position that it was not liable to pay the sums sought by Stephens and the MC because the Company was in liquidation, and any payment of its liabilities was subject to the availability of funds for unsecured creditors.

Moreover any such payment had to adhere to the order of priority of creditors who had proven their debts, as well as the *pari passu* rule. In this context the MC had not filed any proof of debt with the liquidator.

[15] Negotiations ensued to resolve the impasse as the liquidator had to realise the Company's assets, but no resolution was reached.

[16] The Company then, through its liquidator, filed a claim at the Strata Management Tribunal at Putrajaya ('**ST Proceedings**'), seeking *inter alia*, an order that:

- (a) Stephens be directed to execute the memorandum of transfer without imposing any administrative and application fees; and
- (b) The MC issue the clearance letter upon the Company's payment of a sum of RM43,805.34.

[17] The MC filed a counterclaim for the sum it was owed and followed this up with an application in the winding up court for leave to commence or proceed with its counterclaim in the ST Proceedings under **section 226(3) of the then Companies Act 1965**.

The Decision of the High Court in respect of the MC's application for leave to commence or proceed against the Company under section 226(3) of the Companies Act 1965 (now repealed)

[18] The High Court refused the MC's application for leave to commence or proceed with any action against the Company. In declining to do so, the High Court held in summary that the requirements for leave to proceed against the Company in liquidation had not been met. This was because the only issue between the Company and MC was whether the Company was bound to pay the outgoings claimed by MC, i.e. whether that debt was due and payable. The High Court concluded that the MC's claim was bound to fail for two reasons:

- (i) Any claim made by MC before 31 May 2011 was time barred



as at 31 May 2017 as no claim could be brought six years after the cause of action arose;

- (ii) More significantly for the purposes of this appeal, MC is an unsecured creditor and the remaining assets of the Company had to be distributed *pari passu* amongst its unsecured creditors. Any payment of the sums demanded by MC would amount to an undue preference in favour of MC which contravenes the statutory insolvency regime as prescribed at the material time under **section 292 of the Companies Act 1965** (and now **section 527 of the Companies Act 2016**);
- (iii) MC had not filed a proof of debt in relation to its claim and therefore sought to circumvent the prescribed winding up process for creditors. The counterclaim sought to be brought was purely monetary in nature and MC ought to have filed a proof of debt to enable the liquidator to deal with it in the course of the winding up process.
- (iv) In totality, MC's claim was monetary and did not involve complex issues of fact or law. It could be sufficiently dealt with in the course of the winding up process in the winding up court and did not require separate adjudication albeit in the Tribunal or any other court.

The Decision of the Court of Appeal

[19] Dissatisfied, the Company appealed to the Court of Appeal, which reversed the decision of the High Court and decided that this was a proper case to grant leave under **section 226(3) of the Companies Act 1965**.

[20] The Court of Appeal, in allowing MC's appeal and granting leave to proceed against the Company in liquidation for the purposes of recovery of the sums of money stated to be due and owing to it, decided *inter alia*, that:

- (a) **Section 77 SMA** provides that the amount due to the MC is a

‘**guaranteed sum**’ and therefore a valid point of law arose which required ventilation. This point of law was whether MC would remain an unsecured creditor who was entitled together with other unsecured creditors to the remaining assets of the Company on a *pari passu* basis, or be elevated to the status of a secured creditor of the company by virtue of the fact that the monies owed by the Company to it was a ‘**guaranteed sum**’ under **section 77 SM A**;

- (b) While the test relating to the grant of leave to commence or proceed against a company in liquidation is not in dispute, the MC was entitled under the SMA to recover the guaranteed sum in the Tribunal as a debt due and owing to it; and
- (c) As **section 77** utilised the word ‘**shall**’ it imposed a mandatory obligation on the proprietor, here the Company, to pay any outstanding amount due to the MC before the property was disposed of to third parties.

[21] The reasoning of the Court of Appeal in determining that this was a fit case for the grant of leave for MC to bring a claim against the Company in a separate court, apart from the winding up court, runs awry of the settled and trite principles of insolvency law. This is so in two respects, namely:

- (a) The law relating to the grant of leave to proceed against a company in liquidation in an adjudicatory forum other than the winding up court. The test is whether the claim can be adequately determined in the winding up court without incurring the time and expense of initiating or proceeding with new proceedings in a separate court. The claim here relates to a straightforward and simply computed debt. The primary issue in determining the quantum relates to limitation. No complex issues of law arise in relation to the debt *per se*. Accordingly, the grant of leave to proceed against the Company in the Tribunal in respect of a simple monetary claim, contravenes



settled principles for the grant of leave.

- (b) More significantly, the preliminary view expressed by the Court of Appeal to the effect that by virtue of **section 77 SMA**, which uses the phrase ‘guaranteed sum’, the claim of the management corporation i.e. MC, is no longer an unsecured debt but is accorded priority and elevated to a status/position equivalent to that of a secured creditor. Such a preliminary view was expressed without consideration of the statutory insolvency regime in the Companies’ Act or the *pari passu* principle in relation to the class of unsecured creditors.

The Competing Submissions before this Court

[22] The foregoing summary captures the essence of the argument the Company put forward before us. It was submitted that the Court of Appeal departed from settled principles of law relating to secured and unsecured debts by advocating the position that **section 77 SMA** created a new category of secured creditor outside of the statutory insolvency regime in the **Companies Act 2016**. The fact of the matter is that the outstanding sum is an unsecured debt and accordingly ought to be dealt with by the winding up court by way of the lodgement of a proof of debt form.

[23] The Respondent essentially supported the reasoning and judgment of the Court of Appeal, namely that on a proper construction of **section 77 of the SMA 2013, the outstanding sum is a secured debt**. It was further submitted that the issue could not adequately be resolved before the winding up Court.

Our Decision

Does Section 77 of the Strata Management Act 2013 create a preferred or priority status equivalent to a secured debt with in the in solvency regime ?

[24] The **Companies Act 1965** (then) and the **Companies Act 2016** now

in force provide a comprehensive regime relating to the law of insolvency upon a company being wound up. These statutes contain similar statutory provisions in relation to the priority of payments due to secured and unsecured debtors in liquidation. Those provisions are **section 292** under the **1965 Act** and **section 527** under the present **Companies Act 2016**.

“Section 292. Priorities.

(1) *Subject to this Act, in a winding up there shall be paid in priority to all other unsecured debts -*

- (a) *firstly, the costs and expenses of the winding up including the taxed costs of a petitioner payable under section 220, the remuneration of the liquidator and the costs of any audit carried out pursuant to section 281;*
- (b) *secondly, all wages or salary (whether or not earned wholly or in part by way of commission) including any amount payable by way of allowance or reimbursement under any contract of employment or award or agreement regulating conditions of employment, of any employee not exceeding one thousand five hundred ringgit or such other amount as may be prescribed from time to time whether for time or piecework in respect of services rendered by him to the company within a period of four months before the commencement of the winding up;*
- (c) *thirdly, all amounts due in respect of worker's compensation under any written law relating to worker's compensation accrued before the commencement of the winding up;*
- (d) *fourthly, all remuneration payable to any employee in respect of vacation leave, or in the case of his death to any other person in his right, accrued in respect of any*

period before the commencement of the winding up;

- (e) fifthly, all amounts due in respect of contributions payable during the twelve months next before the commencement of the winding up by the company as the employer of any person under any written law relating to employees superannuation or provident funds or under any scheme of superannuation or retirement benefit which is an approved scheme under the federal law relating to income tax; and*
- (f) sixthly, the amount of all federal tax assessed under any written law before the date of the commencement of the winding up or assessed at any time before the time fixed for the proving of debts has expired.*

(2) The debts in each class specified in subsection (1) shall rank in the order therein specified but as between debts of the same class shall rank equally between themselves, and shall be paid in full, unless the property of the company is insufficient to meet them, in which case they shall ab ate in equal proportions between themselves.

.....”

[25] **Section 292**, which was applicable at the material time, provides that **after** the payment of preferential debts, the liquidator acts to safeguard the interests of the unsecured creditors. That in turn is ensured by the collection and distribution of the assets of the company *pari passu* amongst unsecured creditors. See: *Mosbert Bhd (In Liquidation) v. Stella D’Cruz* [1985] 1 LNS 47 FC.

[26] Any interpretation which seeks to dislodge the se statutory provisions and settled principles of insolvency law cannot be supported. In essence the question s before us were:

- (a) Whether **section 77 of the SM A** dislodges or ousts the priority

regime as set out in **section 292 of the Companies Act 1965** ?

- (b) Whether the **SMA** elevates the payment of the arrears of management fees to the status of a secured debt by reason of the term ‘guaranteed’ in the said section?

[27] The simple answer to these two questions is that **section 77** has no such effect. It neither dislodges the statutory priority regime in the **Companies Act** nor elevates the payment of management fees to the status of a secured debt.

[28] We concur with counsel for the Company that at best the word ‘guarantee’ in **section 77 of the SMA** denotes a statutory obligation between the MC and a parcel proprietor, entitling the MC to recover maintenance and other related service charges from a parcel proprietor.

[29] This is reinforced by **sub-section (3) of section 77** which refers to the sum due from a parcel proprietor to the MC as a ‘debt’ which is actionable by the MC vide a suit filed in court or in the strata tribunal. That right to sue for a debt is a right *in personam* and not a right *in rem*. The MC therefore enjoys a right *in personam* to recover the debt from the parcel proprietor. It goes no further than that.

[30] There is nothing in the language of **section 77** which even makes reference to or purports to oust such insolvency principles. That is because **section 77** was never crafted nor intended to encroach upon, or disrupt the priority regime in the **Companies Act**. Any provision which seeks to achieve priority can only be done by way of statutory provision and that too, *vide* positive, clear and unambiguous words. It is evident from a perusal of **section 77** that Parliament never intended to displace any part of the statutory insolvency regime.

[31] It served instead to statutorily provide that the non - payment of management fees creates an undisputed debt. The term ‘guaranteed’ ensures the fact of the existence of such a debt. It ensures that parcel proprietors do

not evade their obligations to make such payments. The recovery of such debts is thus assured and can simply be effected under the section.

[32] As such, a reading of **section 77** which purports to accord such a debt priority on a parity akin to a secured debt is to miscomprehend and misconstrue both the effect of the section and the statutory insolvency regime in this jurisdiction.

[33] Ultimately therefore **section 77** was never intended to, and does not go further than ensuring a fail -safe method of recovering management fees as an undisputed debt from parcel proprietors at the behest of the MC.

[34] It follows that when **section 77** is construed in the context of the entirety of the **SM A**, and in light of the general regime of insolvency law as set out in the **Companies Act**, the outstanding sum payable to the MC is **not** a secured debt. It is a guaranteed debt *vis a vis* the Company and the MC, which is a different matter altogether. It has no effect on the rights of third party creditors, such as secured creditors or other unsecured creditors.

[35] Our rationale is borne out by **section 292** as well as the importance of the *pari passu* rule in insolvency in relation to unsecured creditors. The MC is such an unsecured creditor. In *Malaysian Trustees Bhd v. Transmile Group Bhd & Ors* [2012] 3 MLJ 679 the sanctity of the rule in insolvency law was expressed as follows:

“[22] The pari passu rule is the cornerstone of insolvency law. It is one of the most fundamental principles of the law of liquidation and is at the very heart of the whole statutory scheme of winding up. It is considered as the most universal of all insolvency principles. It is an old equitable principle that all persons similarly situated are entitled to equality in treatment in the distribution of the assets of the company in the process of liquidation (see McPherson’s Law of Company Liquidation at para 13.100 at pp 13 -1051 and Roy Good Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law at p. 175 para 7.02).... .”



[36] In *Transmile (supra)* the Court of Appeal went on to explain that **section 292(1)** provides for the distribution of assets in winding up. **The liquidator is obliged firstly to apply the available unencumbered assets to settle the preferential debts as statutorily provided for and secondly to pay the unsecured debts of the company *pari passu*.** As such ‘*debts of the same class shall rank equally between themselves and shall be paid in full, unless the property of the company is insufficient to meet them, in which case they shall abate in equal proportions between themselves.*’

[37] To reiterate the leave question reads as follows:

“Whether the right of a Joint Management Body or a Management Corporation to collect and receive payment from a proprietor under sections 33 and 77 of the Strata Management Act 2013 respectively, gives it a lawful preference as a secured creditor over the assets of a company in liquidation?” (emphasis ours).

[38] For the reasons we have enumerated above, we had no hesitation in answering the sole leave question in the negative.

Leave to Commence or Proceed with Proceedings for recovery of the arrears of management fees

[39] That brings us to the secondary issue of whether leave ought to have been granted to the MC to enable it to proceed with the recovery of the debt owed to it by the Company, or whether it would suffice for the recovery to be effected by way of the filing of a proof of debt form in the winding up court.

[40] It is apparent from our analysis above that the use of the word ‘guaranteed’ in the **SMA** ensures and assures straightforward recovery of the debt claimed by the MC. The fact of the existence of a debt is easily established and payment due ‘guaranteed’. What may well remain in issue is limitation. That issue is a matter of law and may be resolved without difficulty. It is certainly not a complex issue that requires adjudication in a

court of law. We failed to see any exceptional issue in this case that precluded the Respondent from filing a proof of debt in the winding up court.

[41] As such the High Court Judge was correct in applying the test he did, premised on the well-known principles cited, *inter alia* in *Mosbert Berhad (in Liquidation) v. Stella D' Cruz* [1985] 2 MLJ 446 and more recently by the Court of Appeal in *Ganda Setia Cemerlang Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Maika Holdings Bhd* [2017] 1 LNS 1576. The test is that set out in the old English decision of *Re Cuthbert Lead Smelting Co Ltd* [1886] WN 84 which held that if the party applying for leave could obtain all the relief in the winding up, leave would be refused. If that party's claim cannot however be adequately dealt with in the winding up or if the remedy sought cannot be granted in the winding up proceedings then leave would be granted.

[42] For the reasons set out above, it is evident in the instant case that recovery of the debt is easily procured in the winding up proceedings by the filing of a proof of debt form. There is therefore no necessity for the grant of a leave.

CONCLUSION

[43] The reasons we have set out in full in this judgment comprise the basis for the decision we made at the hearing of the appeal. To reiterate, we allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal, and restored the order of the High Court. We answered the leave question in the negative.

(NALLINI PATHMANATHAN)

Judge

Federal Court of Malaysia

Dated: 21 MAY 2020



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