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14 June 2024

LAW OF DEFAMATION

Defamation – Half-truth – Malice – Justification – Fair Comment – Qualified Privilege – Substantially True – Whatsapp – Misrepresentation

Seema Elizabeth Isoy v Tan Sri David Chiu Tat-Cheong
Civil Appeal No. W-02(f)-54-09/2023(W) | Federal Court

- see the grounds of judgment here

Facts Seema Elizabeth Isoy (“the Appellant”), is the registered owner of a unit in Waldorf & Windsor Tower Serviced Apartments (W&W) which was developed by Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd (“Mayland”). The appellant together with 55 other persons were in the W&W Whatsapp Group, consisting of unit owners or their representatives. Tan Sri David Chiu Tat-Cheong (“the Respondent”), is a businessman and the Chairman and founder of Mayland. There were several legal disputes in Court involving Mayland and W&W and in one of the cases, the High Court decided that Mayland had defrauded and/or made a false representation to W&W owners in respect of a common area in W&W. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal and Mayland’s application for leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal was not granted by the Federal Court. In August 2017, the Appellant sent a text message (“impugned statement”) to the W&W Whatsapp Group. Dissatisfied, the Respondent filed a defamation claim against the Appellant for the message she sent to the WhatsApp group, alleging that the Chiu family was embroiled in legal troubles and implying Chiu was involved in fraudulent activities. The High Court dismissed the claim, finding the statements were not defamatory and accepting the Appellant’s defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege. However, the Court of Appeal overturned this decision, ruling that the statements were defamatory and motivated by malice. Hence this appeal.

Issues 1. Whether Malaysian courts can rely on foreign common law regarding "half-truth" statements in defamation cases, considering local statutory provisions (e.g., Civil Law Act 1956) that offer remedies.
2. Whether sections 8 and 9 of the Defamation Act provide a basis for the defences of justification and fair comment, especially when the impugned statements are substantially true but omit certain facts (like the respondent’s acquittal).
3. Whether a substantially true statement that mentions criminal charges but omits the acquittal is protected under the Defamation Act.
4. The applicability of the half-truth doctrine within the established defamation threshold test in Malaysia.

Held In dismissing the appeal, YA Dato’ Nordin Bin Hassan in delivering the decision of the Federal Court emphasized the defamatory nature of the statement made by the Appellant, which was deemed a "half-truth" and thus misleading. The Federal Court found that the statement injured the Respondent’s reputation and that Appellant acted with malice by deliberately leaving out that the Respondent had been acquitted. The court also rejected the application of the defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege, finding them unsustainable. Furthermore, the Federal Court upheld the Court of Appeal's interpretation of the law, including the applicability of the common law concept of "half-truth" as consistent with Malaysian law under the Civil Law Act 1956. The court concluded that the Appellant’s statement was defamatory, referred to the Respondent, and was published with malicious intent. The Federal Court found that the Appellant’s appeal was without merit and upheld the Court of Appeal's ruling ordering the Appellant to pay RM50,000 in cost to the Respondent.

Zul Rafique & Partners
{14 June 2024}

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